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Recent Cases
CIVIL PROCEDURE-RES JUDICATA IN DIVORCE
AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
State ex rel. Ward v. Stubbsl
Kathleen M. Ward, relator, in an original proceeding before the Supreme
Court of Missouri, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial of a divorce
case after her own cross-petition for divorce had been struck. This proceeding
was the culmination of litigation which had taken place over a -period of several
years.
On January 26, 1951, relator filed a suit for separate maintenance against
her husband, Charles T. Ward, in the circuit court of Jackson County. On June
25, 1956, relator's suit was dismissed with prejudice, for lack of prosecution.
Charles T. Ward, on October 1, 1956, filed for divorce in Jackson County. Relator, defendant in this suit, had by this time left Missouri and taken up residence in California. This suit remained pending with no service until relator
returned to Kansas City and voluntarily entered her appearance on September
27, 1962. At this time relator filed her answer and a cross-petition for divorce.
On November 5, 1962, plaintiff Charles T. Ward filed a motion to strike defendant's cross-petition for divorce, contending that the dismissal of relator's
separate maintenance action was res judicata as to the allegations in her crosspetition. On January 22, 1963, plaintiff's motion to strike relator's cross-petition
was sustained. Trial was set for April 1, 1963. On January 30, 1963 relator filed
a motion for new trial attacking the court's dismissal of her cross-petition for
divorce. This motion was overruled. Relator then filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition. A stop order was issued, followed by a preliminary writ of prohibition on April 9, 1963.
Relator relied on two contentions in her petition for a writ of prohibition.
First, she urged that the suit for separate maintenance had not been conclusively
adjudicated and, therefore, was not subject to res judicata. The supreme court
held that dismissal with prejudice of the separate maintenance action for want
of prosecution was within the discretion of the circuit court of Jackson County.2
Second, relator argued that issues raised by her cross-petition, concerning the
conduct of her husband subsequent to the dismissal of the separate maintenance
suit, could not possibly be res judicata. The supreme court agreed.
Res judicata prevented relitigation of facts and issues raised in relator's
1. 374 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
2. Id. at 41.
(153)
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prior suit for separate maintenance.3 Res judicata also applied to facts that could
have been alleged prior to dismissal of the suit, as relator could have amended
her complaint to include new matters up to that time.4 Res judicata did not apply
to facts occurring after dismissal of the suit for separate maintenance.
The court held in effect that separate maintenance and divorce are the same
causes of action.3 A former adjudication on the same cause of action between the
same parties is conclusive, in the second proceeding, as to every issue or fact
which was or could have been litigated in the first. Missouri courts have called
this estoppel by judgment, 6 and it broadens the scope of res judicata beyond
facts and issues actually decided in the prior suit. Estoppel by verdict (i.e., collateral estoppel) is applicable to a judgment between the same parties on a different cause of action, with res judicata extending to facts actually decided and
7
necessarily determined in rendering the prior judgment.
The test of the identity of causes of action used by the Missouri courts is
the identity of the facts essential to maintain them.$ Despite certain differences
between the effects of the two suits, 9 to prevail in an action for separate maintenance in Missouri a wife must prove facts that would entitle her to a divorce.10
3. Dismissal with prejudice of a prior suit operates as an adjudication on
the merits. Max v. Spaeth, 349 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961). Where the same cause of
action is involved in a later suit, the dismissal with prejudice extends to matters
which could have been decided in the first suit. Rippe v. Sutter, 308 S.W.2d 635

(Mo. 1958).
4. State ex rel. Ward v. Stubbs supra note 1, at 47.
5. "It seems that the early law of domestic relations divided divorce actions into two distinct divisions. One was known as divorce a vinculo -matrimonii,
or absolute divorce, which totally dissolved the bonds of matrimony between
the contracting parties; the second was known as divorce a mensa et thoro, which
was recognized as only a suspension of the marriage status . . . and continued
the obligation of support. . . . The second above noted division came in time
to be called an action for separate maintenance. In Missouri law, however, the
concept is now held that divorce a vinculo inatrimonliand divorce a 'rnensa et thoro
are substantially indivisible portions of the one action for divorce." Ellis v. Ellis,
263 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Mo. 1953).
"[Wlhile a divorce proceeding is broader in scope than a separate maintenance
case (because it severs the marriage relation) yet as to maintenance it is substantially the same." State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, 357 Mo. 634, 643, 210 S.W.2d
31, 35 (1948). Contra, Sharpe v. Sharpe, 134 Mo. App. 278, 281, 114 S.W. 584,
585 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908).
6. Reis v. La Presto, 324 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Mo. 1959); Abeles v. Wurdack,
285 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Mo. 1955); State ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
317 Mo. 1078, 1088, 298 S.W. 83, 87-88 (1927); Prough v. Prough, 308 S.W.2d
294, 295 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957). The doctrine in this form. was first enunciated by
a Missouri court in National Bank of Commerce v. Maryland Cas. Co., 307 Mo.
417, 435, 270 S.W. 691, 696 (1925), which expressly quoted from Pierce v. National Bank of Commerce, 268 Fed. 487, 495 (8th Cir. 1920).
7. Cases cited note 6 sutpra.
8. Healy v. Moore, 100 S.W.2d 601, 605 (K.C. Mo. App. 1936).
9. Cases cited note 4 supra.
10. Ellis v. Ellis, stpra note 5; Thomason v. Thomason, 262 S.W.2d 349,
352 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Dallas v. Dallas, 233 S.W.2d 738, 745 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1950); Meredith v. Meredith, 166 S.W.2d 221, 223 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942);
Glick v. Glick, 226 Mo. App. 271, 276, 41 S.W.2d 624, 626 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
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State v. Stubbs reaffirms the Missouri doctrine that divorce and separate maintenance suits are considered to be the same action. 11
It has been suggested' 2 that a wife may win a separate maintenance suit by
proving actual abandonment for less than a year,' 3 while in a situation of constructive abandonment' 4 the wife must still prove facts entitling her to a divorce.
Given this assumption, divorce and separate maintenance might not be the same
cause of action in a situation of actual abandonment. It would follow that a prior
suit would be res judicata only to the extent of facts actually decided and determined in the prior judgment.
A lack of uniformity in Missouri on the question whether in a divorce action
desertion can be used as an indignity or must in itself be sufficient grounds for divorce,15 further complicates matters. In Missouri, "indignities" necessarily involve
mental cruelty in some form. 16 It thus would seem that actual desertion could
not be an indignity unless the court were to unduly stretch the meaning of mental
cruelty.17
"The term 'indignity' has the same meaning when used in connection with actions
for separate maintenance as in the case of actions for divorce." Dietrich v.
Dietrich, 209 S.W.2d 540, 544 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948).
11. Cases cited note 5 supra.
12. Ramsay, Separate Maintenance in Missouri, 12 Mo. L. REv. 138, 158
(1947), citing Elsey v. Elsey, 297 S.W. 978, 979 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927).
13. For actual abandonment the following must be shown: 1) Cessation,
without good cause, from cohabitation (if the action is for divorce, there is a
statutory period of one year; see § 452.010, RSMo 1959); 2) Intention on the
deserter's part not to resume same; 3) Absence of complainant's consent to the
separation. Parenteau v. Parenteau, 305 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957);
Parsons v. Albertson, 31 S.W.2d 211 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930); Nicholson v.
Nicholson, 214 Mo. App. 570, 580, 264 S.W. 82, 85 (Spr. Ct. App. 1924).
14. Constructive abandonment is used to justify one spouse leaving the other
because of conduct which, if proved, would entitle her (or him) to divorce upon
grounds of indignities. Grant v. Grant, 171 Mo. App. 317, 322, 157 S.W. 673, 674
(K.C. Ct. App. 1913).
15. "Proof . . . of abandonment for any length of time . . . constitutes an
indignity though such abandonment also constitutes abandonment itself, under
the statute." Smiley v. Smiley, 207 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Spr. Mo. App. 1947). See also
Cannon v. Cannon, 17 Mo. App. 390, 393 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885). Contra, Kern v.
Kern, 141 S.W.2d 164, 170, 171 (Spr. Mo. App. 1940). "Desertion is not an indignity, but is, in itself, if for a period of one year, a ground for divorce," O'Hern
v. O'Hem, 228 S.W. 533, 536 (K.C. Mo. App. 1921).
16. Whitwell v. Whitwell, 318 Mo. 476, 481, 300 S.W. 455, 456 (1927);
Miskimen v. Miskimen, 344 S.W.2d 289, 292 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961); Oliver v.
Oliver, 325 S.W.2d 33, 38-39 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); Magruder v. Magruder, 31
S.W.2d 213, 214 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930); Bedal v. Bedal, 2 S.W.2d 180, 183 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1928); Scholl v. Scholl, 194 Mo. App. 559, 566, 185 S.W. 762, 764
(St. L. Mo. App. 1916).
17. An example would best illustrate this potential problem. The husband
actually abandons the wife. The wife sues for divorce on certain indignities before
the one year statutory requirement for desertion has run. The wife loses the suit
for divorce. The wife later brings suit for separate maintenance, on grounds of
abandonment. The question thus arises whether the wife is barred by res
judicata from proving the element of cessation, without good cause, from cohabitation, which necessarily occurred before the first suit for divorce. If the court
considers abandonment as an indignity, and further considers the two suits to be
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A question not directly considered by the court in the principal case was
whether prior courses of conduct that did not give rise to a cause of action as indignities could be used in a later suit together with other subsequent indignities
to effect a valid cause of action. This question is of particular importance in light
of Missouri decisions stating that one "indignity" is not sufficient grounds for divorce or separate maintenance.18 For "indignities" to be sufficient to justify granting divorce or separate maintenance they must amount to a continuous course of
conduct as distinguished from the single or occasional act.19
An early Missouri case, Searcy v. Searcy,2 0 held that proof of conduct prior to
adjudication of the first suit might be allowed. In that case, a divorce action, the
indignities occurring before a final adjudication of a prior suit were introduced as
evidence for the purpose of strengthening subsequent allegations. Concerning
evidence occurring before the first suit, the court stated:
That evidence was admissible along with any subsequently occurring
facts giving rise to grounds for divorce, and could be considered as emphasizing and strengthening any facts arising after the former judgment. 21
However, this viewpoint was later discarded by the very judge who had advanced
3
it.22 The plaintiff in Brady v. Brady=
relied on the theory of the Searcy case. The
the same causes of action and applies estoppel by judgment the wife finds herself in a dilemma. She is precluded from going into anything that could have been
decided in the first suit. While abandonment was not material in the first suit,
as the one year period had not lapsed, it is important in this suit for separate
maintenance. However, any proof of cessation without good cause would be
analagous to strengthening or emphasizing subsequent allegations.
If the second suit, for separate maintenance, were to be considered a different
cause of action then the wife could offer proof of the lack of justification concerning the abandonment by her spouse, if it were a fact not actually decided in the
prior suit. But should this extend to other conduct that occurred prior to the
first suit? It would seem that for purposes of res judicata the theory that separate
maintenance and divorce are different causes of action in case of actual abandonment should not be extended to all possible indignities.
18. Moore v. Moore, 337 S.W.2d 781, 787 (Spr. Mo. App. 1960); Ames v.
Ames, 284 S.W.2d 888, 893 (K.C. Mo. App. 1955); Chapman v. Chapman, 230
S.W.2d 149, 151 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950); Hess v. Hess, 232 Mo. App. 825, 830,
113 S.W.2d 139, 142 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938); England v. England, 225 Mo. App.
725, 730, 39 S.W.2d 429, 432 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
19. Heaven v. Heaven, 363 S.W.2d 33, 39 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Cadenhead v. Cadenhead, 265 S.W.2d 426, 435 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954); Garton v. Garton, 246 S.W.2d 832, 838 (K.C. Mo. App. 1952); White v. White, 180 S.W.2d 229,
230 (Spr. Mo. App. 1944); Stevens v. Stevens, 158 S.W.2d 238, 240 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1942); Johnston v. Johnston, 260 S.W. 770, 772 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924);
Rudd v. Rudd, 238 S.W. 537, 541 (St. L. Mo. App. 1922).
20. Searcy v. Searcy, 196 Mo. App. 311, 193 S.W. 871 (K.C. Ct. App. 1917).
The husband filed suit for divorce in 1907 alleging certain indignities. Judgment
favored the wife and the husband's petition was dismissed in 1909. The husband
brought suit for divorce in 1915 alleging substantially the same facts.
21. Id. at 315, 193 S.W. at 873.
22. Trimble, P.J., referred to his remarks in Searcy v. Searcy, supra note 21,
as "unguarded" and further stated, "however unfortunate the remark was or may
have been, it is manifest from the opinion that neither party could go back of the
former judgment to repon it or to establish such prior facts as an issue in the
f
second suit." Coons v. Coons, 236 S.W. 358, 363 (K.C.Mo. App. 1922).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/18
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court, however, refused to allow the plaintiff to strengthen or emphasize her case
for divorce by admitting evidence of acts occurring before the trial of a prior
separate maintenance suit.24 The court held that a final adjudication on a prior
separate maintenance suit was res judicata, as to all facts and issues that were or
could have been raised, in a later suit for divorce. 25 Thus the law of Missouri
is settled that in divorce or separate maintenance suits facts and issues, including
those concerned with indignities, are res judicata in the second suit through
estoppel by judgment. 28
State v. Stubbs is representative of authority in Missouri that prior indignities, insufficient in the first suit, cannot be coupled with other indignities in a later
suit to strengthen the allegations, for they have been adjudged and conclusively
settled. 27 In the future a Missouri court may be presented with a fact situation
in which it would be advantageous to treat separate maintenance and divorce
as two causes of action. If this occurs, it remains to be seen how the courts will
treat courses of conduct that were not brought up in the first suit but that a
party wants to use in a later suit.
ROBERT L. JAcKsoN, JR.

23. "Plaintiff throughout this whole proceeding has depended for her chief
authority upon the case of Searcy v. Searcy, 196 Mo. App. 311, 193 S.W. 871,
wherein it was indeed said that evidence of matters occurring prior to a former
judgment would be admissible along with any subsequently occurring facts giving
rise to grounds for divorce .... " Brady v. Brady, 71 S.W.2d 42, 48 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1934).
24. Id. at 48.
25. "In determining in the former case the plaintiff was not entitled to
separate maintenance, we not only held, but were bound to hold, that defendant
had been guilty of no indignities affording plaintiff a ground for divorce . . . ." I'd.
at 47.
26. Ezell v. Ezell, 348 S.W.2d 592, 596 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Price v.
Price, 281 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Ackley v. Ackley, 257 S.W.2d
404, 407 (Spr. Mo. App. 1953).
27. See, e.g., Price v. Price, 281 S.W.2d 307 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955). In that
case the court discussed a prior suit where the husband had brought an action for
divorce and the wife filed a cross-bill for divorce alleging four indignities. Both
the petition and cross-bill were dismissed by the court. The wife then brought suit
for separate maintenance alleging the same four indignities plus two additional
ones. The court disallowed the four original indignities on grounds of res judicata.
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DISCOVERY-INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES-CONTINUING
DUTY TO ANSWER IN MISSOURI
Ailgur v. Zylcl 1
Plaintiff filed a petition on March 22, 1962, alleging personal injuries from
being struck by defendant's car. On May 14, 1963, defendant served plaintiff with
written interrogatories which requested names and addresses of persons having
knowledge of the accident. Plaintiff responded that there were two or more witnesses but he did not presently know their names. At trial plaintiff produced two
witnesses whom he had discovered long after the interrogatory answer was filed
but two months before trial. The trial court sustained defendant's objections and
refused to allow the witnesses to testify. The jury returned a verdict for defendant.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial solely on the ground that the court had erred in
refusing the testimony of the two witnesses. The trial court granted the motion.
Defendant appealed.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that the discretion of the trial court
to exclude or allow the offered testimony extended to plaintiff's motion for a new
trial. The appellate court found no abuse of that discretion by the lower court. Its
decision was therefore affirmed.
The court expressly avoided the question of whether Missouri discovery rules
require a party to amend original answers to inform the other party of information within the scope of the interrogatories but not known at the time of interrogation. The case, therefore, adds little to the ambiguity of Missouri law pertaining
to the continuing duty to answer interrogatories. 2
The Missouri Civil Procedure Rules do not deal specifically with a continuing duty to answer. They merely require answers to be made fully in writing under
oath and allow the use of more than one set of interrogatories so long as the privilege is not abused.5 No statute or case has required that a party must continue
to furnish his opponent information after truthfully answering the original interrogatories.
In Silver v. Westlake4 plaintiff sued for personal injuries. Defendant was served
with interrogatories including a request for names of witnesses to the accident. He
answered he knew of none, but the testimony of a witness he produced at trial was
admitted. After judgment for defendant, plaintiff moved for a new trial. The court
denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed, objecting for the first time to the testimony
of defendant's witness. The supreme court affirmed, pointing out there was no showing defendant knew of such a witness at the time of interrogation. The court held
1. 390 S.W.2d 553 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
2. This discussion is concerned only with the duty of a party to amend
answers to interrogatories in the event requested information, not known at the
time of interrogation, is later discovered. The problem of the duty and sanctions
to be imposed upon a party with present knowledge who fails to answer the interrogatories fully is not considered here. Neither is the situation discussed where
the answers requested are not within the scope of discovery.
3. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
4. 248 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. 1952).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/18
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that plaintiff had waived any objection to the testimony after trial since he had
made no earlier objection to it.
In Fitzpatrick v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.5 brakeman-plaintiff was allowed
to testify to matters occurring at milepost 34-20. Such information had not been
included in his answer to defendant's written interrogatory asking at what milepost
plaintiff was injured. Defendant could not show himself prejudiced since the particular location had been referred to in the amended petition and in plaintiff's
deposition.
In Faught v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 6 testimony of one of plaintiff's coworkers was obiected to by defendant because his name was not included in the
answers to interrogatories. The court refused a new trial because there was no
showing defendant was surprisedY
In contrast, testimony of later-discovered witnesses was excluded in Central
& So. Truck Lines v. Westfall GMC Truck, Inc.8 Here interrogatories were answered
twenty months before trial. Defendant's counsel found three new witnesses three
days before trial and informed opposing counsel the next day. Defendant was
denied a motion to amend his answers to interrogatories the morning of trial. The
witnesses were not allowed to testify. The court felt the request was without just
cause and prejudicial to plaintiff. Neither was a continuance a fair solution, the
court concluded. 9
These few Missouri cases leave unanswered the question of a litigant's continuing duty to amend interrogatory answers. The problem of this continuing duty
has been met in other jurisdictions in a variety of ways.' 0 The federal courts have
5. 300 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. 1957).
6. 325 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. 1959).
7. Defendant 'had listed the same witness's name in its own answers to interrogatories.
8. 317 S.W.2d 841 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958).
9. Plaintiff's witnesses had been specifically arranged for that date.
10. For cases excluding the testimony see Frankel v. Stake, 33 F.R.D. 1 (E.D.
Pa. 1963); Taggart v. Vermont Transp. Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd,
325 F.2d 1022 (3rd Cir. 1964); Dempski v. Dempski, 27 Ill.2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 734
(1963); Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 122 N.W.2d 110 (1963); D'Agostino v. Schafferg 45 N.J. Super. 395, 133 A.2d 45 (1957); Burke v. Central R.R.,
42 N.J. Super. 387, 126 A.2d 903 (1956). For cases allowing the testimony see
Wray M. Scott Co. v. Daigle, 309 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1962); Doric Co. v. Leo
Jay Rosen Associates, Inc., 303 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1962); Triumph Hosiery Mills,
Inc. v. Alamance Indus., Inc., 299 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
924 (1962); Texas & P. Ry. v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 984 (1956); Wembley, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Co., 216 F. Supp. 565 (D. Md.
1963); King v. Cardin, 229 Ark. 929, 319 S.W.2d 214 (1959); Hansel v. Friemann,
38 Ill. App.2d 259, 187 N.E.2d 97 (1962); Muggenburg v. Leighton, 241 Minn.
498, 63 N.W.2d 533 (1954); Atlantic No. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293,
96 A.2d 652 (1953); Capone v. Norton, 11 NJ. Super. 189, 78 A.2d 126 (1951),
aff'd, 8 N.J. 54, 83 A.2d 710 (1951); Schwartz v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp.,
64 A.2d 477 (NJ. Essex County Ct. 1949). For cases granting a new trial see
Newsum v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 97 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Abbetamarco
v. Colton, 31 N.J. Super. 181, 106 A.2d 12 (1954). For cases where the court
ordered the answers to be supplemented see Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25
F.R.D. 186 (1960), appeal dismissed, 26 F.R.D. 12 (D. Del. 1960); Coyne v.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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generally recognized a duty to supply additional information received after answers
were made, absent any request by the interrogating party.11
Apparently only two jurisdictions have express rules governing this problem.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania requires answers to be supplemented if discovery of further information would alter the original answers.12 New Jersey requires answers to be amended if new information which renders the answers incomplete is obtained after the pre-trial conference?13 The pre-trial conference in
New Jersey is required in most contested cases. 14 Therefore amendment is not
usually necessary unless the information was not available at the conference. The
usual sanction in New Jersey for non-compliance is exclusion of the evidence. 15
In other jurisdictions opinion is divided over the desirability of requiring a
duty for continuing answers. Proponents maintain that the purpose of the discovery rules demands a continuing duty to answer. The object of such rules is to
facilitate a trial with an outcome based on the merits rather than "legal maneuvering." This purpose is defeated if the element of surprise is still possible by introduction of evidence at trial which was not disclosed and for which no preparation
Monongahela Connecting R.R., 24 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Fidelis Fisheries,
Ltd. v. Thorden, 12 F.R.D. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Kling v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 9 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1949); Chenault v. Nebraska Farm Prods., Inc.,
9 F.R.D. 529 (D. Neb. 1949). For cases in which the interrogatories themselves
provided that they were continuing see Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D.
296 (W.D. Pa. 1955); McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 F.R.D. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1954);
Wolf v. Dickinson, 16 F.R.D. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Furmanek v. Southern Trading
Co., 15 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Armstrong v. Diamond State Bus Line, Inc.,
50 Del. 163, 125 A.2d 856 (1956); Troutner v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 5 Pa. D.
& C.2d 545 (1956).
11. See, e.g., Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., supra note 10; Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 10; McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., supra note 10; Smith
v. Acadia Oversea Freighters, Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Fidelis
Fisheries, Ltd. v. Thorden, supra note 10; Kling v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
supra note 10; Chenault v. Nebraska Farm Prods., Inc., supra note 10; Cinema
Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 318 (D. Del. 1947); R.C.A. Mfg. Co.
v. Decca Record, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Troutner v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., supra note 10.
12. E.D. Pennsylvania Local Rule 20f provides:
"Upon discovery by a party of information which renders that party's prior
answers to interrogatories substantially inaccurate, incomplete or untrue,
such party shall file appropriate supplemental answers with reasonable
promptness."
13. N.J. RuLEs 4:23-12 provides:
"If the party furnishing answers to interrogatories shall obtain information subsequent to the pretrial conference which renders such answers
incomplete, amended answers shall be served not later than 10 days prior
to the day fixed for trial. Thereafter amendments may be allowed only
for extraordinary or compelling reasons and to prevent manifest injustice,
and upon such terms as the court may direct. In no case shall amendments
be allowed at the trial where it appears that the evidence sought to be
introduced was known to the party seeking such leave, more than 10 days
prior to trial."
14. N.J. RuLEs 4:29-1.
15. See, e.g., D'Agostino v. Schaffer, supra note 10; Burke v. Central R.R.,
supra note 10.
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was made. 16 Failure to supplement answers has also been considered "incon17
sistent with the standards expected in a learned and honorable profession."' It
has also been held that a full and sufficient answer requires amendment so that it is
5
truthful at time of trial.'
Defendant in Aidgur used the argument that the purpose of interrogatories
is defeated by a faliure to amend them. It was countered by the contention of
most opponents of a required duty-that keeping the adversary informed of the
results of one's diligence in preparing for trial is doing the adversary's work.' 9
Attorneys have argued that a duty of continuing answers would place an unreasonable burden on the interrogated party. It would require him to keep all prior
answers current. It would also stifle initiative by encouraging a lawyer to postpone
or ignore investigation. In addition, the burden would be misplaced since the person wanting the additional information should be the one to use measures available
to avoid his own surprise.20
This last reason-the availability of other alternatives to the interrogating
party-was an element in Aidgur.21 These alternatives include an alternate use
of depositions and interrogatories, discovery at pre-trial conferences, and requesting
continuing answers in the interrogatories themselves. Acknowledging the fact that
a pre-trial conference may not be granted or may be held too soon, the ideal
method to discover later information would seem to be a supplemental interrogatory filed shortly before the trial. This method still may have its disadvantages.
It requires filing two sets of interrogatories in every case with a delicate sense of
timing. If the second set is filed too dose to trial, there is no time to meet new
facts. If filed too long before trial, important facts might be missed.
Assuming the later-acquired information is not discovered before the trial,
there are several ways surprise to the opposing party may be avoided. The court
may find an unfulfilled duty on the part of the interrogated party which has prejudiced his opponent. It may therefore exclude the testimony. 22 If the evidence is
admitted, the interrogating party might obtain a new trial. Also, -he might be
entitled to a continuance after the presentation of the evidence to prepare his defense. 23
In Aulgur the trial judge excluded the testimony and then granted a new trial.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals recognized the fairness which resulted, from this.

16. Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, supra note 10.
17. 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDURE 777.1 (1961).
18. Troutner v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., supra note 10.
19. Aulgur v. Zylich, 390 S.W.2d' 553, 557 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
20. Striegel, The Continuing Aature of Discovery, 34 J. KAN. B.A. 97 (1965).
21. Aulgur v. Zylich, supra note 19, at 555. See also Hansel v. Friemann,
supra note 10; Atlantic No. Airlines v. Schwimmer, supra note 10; Capone v.
Norton, supra note 10.
22. See, e.g., Frankel v. Stake, supra note 10; Taggart v. Vermont Transp.
Co., supra note 10; Dempski v. Dempski, supra note 10; Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki,
supra note 10; D'Agostino v. Schaffer, supra note 10; Burke v. Central R.R., supra
note 10.
23. See Young v. Saroukos, 189 A.2d 437 (Del. 1963).
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It observed the element of surprise to defendant would be obviated while plaintiff
would still be able to present evidence vital to his cause of action. 24
Fairness under the circumstances of each case is emphasized by the courts
dealing with the problem of later-discovered information. Even New Jersey, with
a definite rule imposing a duty to supplement answers, recognizes the desirability
of leniency in enforcing the rule to achieve justice. 25
With this emphasis on fairness, a possible solution has been suggested to the
problem of continuing answers to interrogatories. The interrogated party would
be required to voluntarily supplement his answers. The sanction for non-compliance
would be exclusion of the information. However, the court would have the power
to relax this sanction in the event of mitigating circumstances. 20
Whether or not the proper solution would be a continuing duty to answer,
some definitive action should be taken in Missouri. There is a necessity for a rule
or decision on the duty to continue answers. Attorneys of this state need to know
what is required in discovering and in disclosing information.
HELEN

G.

BREIDENSTEIN

INSURANCE-REFUSAL TO DEFEND AND SETTLEEXCESS LIABILITY
Landie v. Century Indemnity Company1
Century's insured, Dawkins, lent his truck to the Landie brothers. While
operating the vehicle the Landie brothers were involved in a collision with Redman who received serious personal injuries. Redman brought suit against the
Landies who were initially defended by Central Standard Insurance Company. Central, because of intervening bankruptcy, withdrew its defense.
The Landie brothers, claiming to be additional insureds of Century since
they were operating Dawkins' truck with his permission, demanded that Century
defend, and after advising Century that the suit could be settled for the face
amount of the policy requested settlement. The Landies refused to enter into an
agreement for the reservation of rights, and as a result Century refused to defend
or settle claiming there was no permission and no coverage.
Judgment was rendered in excess of the policy limits. The Landies, pursuant
to an agreement with Redman, paid the amount in excess of the policy coverage.
Redman then instituted a garnishment proceeding against Century for the policy
face amount, and in this suit it was established that the Landies were in fact
within the policy coverage. The Landies then brought suit against Century and
24.
25.
26.
1.

Aulgur v. Zylich, supra note 19, at 557.
See Abbetamarco v. Colton, supra note 10
See, e.g., Note, 68 HARv. L. Rnv. 673, 677 (1955).
390 S.W.2d 558 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
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recovered the amount they had paid on the theory of bad faith in refusing to
settle. Century appealed and the Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed.
The general rule, which is followed in Missouri, is that a refusal to defend a
party actually within the policy coverage, even though made under an honest
mistake, is unjustified and amounts to a breach of contract. 2 The insurer's liability is limited to the policy face on the theory of -placing the insured in the same
position in which he would have been had the insurer assumed the defense3 or
settled.4 The only additional liability, under the general rule, is for the attorney
fees and expenses which the insured had to pay by reason of the insurer's failure
to assume the defense.5
However, once the insurance company assumes the defense it must exercise
good faith in refusing to settle within the policy limits. A refusal to settle made in
bad faith will result in: liability to reimburse the insured for the judgment in excess of the policy limits.6 Courts are not in agreement as to whether the basis for
liability should be bad faith or negligence, but all agree that the refusal must be
wrongful. 7 Missouri holds the action is a non-negligent tort based on a bad faith
refusal.8
There is no uniformity in the decisions as to what constitutes bad faith; usually a combination of factors have been considered with no one being conclusive. 9
Although the Missouri decisions on this point are somewhat limited, when considered in conjunction with cases from other jurisdictions they do give an indication of the factors that courts will consider in determinng the presence or absence
of bad faith. These factors include the insurer's failure to investigate the facts
properly,' 0 the seriousness of the injuries inflicted by the insured upon the injured
2. For a collection of Missouri cases following this rule see Annot., 49
A.L.R.2d 694, 713 (1956).
3. See Security Store & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 227 Mo. App.
175, 182, 51 S.W.2d 572, 576 (1932), as to the general rule of what constitutes damages for breach of contract.
4. Bituminious Cas. Corp. v. Walsh & Wlls, Inc., 170 S.W.2d 117 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1943); St. Paul & K. C. Short Line R.R. v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 231 Mo. App. 613, 105 S.W.2d 14 (1937).
5. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1958); Freese v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 252 S.W.2d 653 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1952).
6. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950);
McCombs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 231 Mo. App. 1206, 89 S.W.2d 114 (1935).
7. See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 178-9 (good faith), 186-7 (negligence) (1955); But see 7A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE § 4712 (1962),
where it is pointed out there is more of a difference in verbiage than results in the
courts that apply the bad faith and negligence tests, and some courts use the
terms interchangeably.
8. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., supra note 6.
9. Annot., supra note 7, at 196-226; 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 420 (1960).
See also Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INS.
COUNSEL J. 58, 65 (1961), for additional factors which could be considered in
future decisions.
10. See, e.g., Royal Transit v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th
Cir. 1948); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934);
Roberts v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1950); Henke
v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Ia. 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1959).
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party as indicative of the possibility of an excessive judgment, 11 failure to give
12
due regard to the recommendations of insurer's trial counsel or investigators,
failure to keep insured informed of settlement demands and offers,' 8 attempts to
induce insured to contribute to settlement, 14 compromise rejected after trial verdict against insured, 15 and refusal to stipulate liability where no real dispute
exists.' 0 However, it has been held that something more than mere mistake is
necessary to constitute bad faith.' 7 In the Landie case the jury found bad faith
on the basis of a finding of improper investigation, the failure to give due regard
to the possibility of an excessive verdict because of serious injury.' 8
In the present case, one of first impression in Missouri, there is a combination
of the two siutations: a wrongful refusal to defend and to settle. The only case
directly in point from any jurisdiction is a 1958 California Supreme Court case,
Cot, unale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.19 The court there decided that an insurer
who not only refused to defend, but also rejected a reasonable settlement, should
be in no better position than if it had agreed to defend and then rejected reasonable settlement.20 The court reasoned that a breach of the insurer's obligation
to defend did not release it from its implied duty to consider the insured's interest
21
in the settlement.
In Missouri prior to this case refusal to defend would result in liability only
to the extent of the policy face plus attorney fees and expenses. On the other
hand, if the insurer did assume the defense and exercised bad faith in refusing
to settle, the insurer would be liable for the entire judgment, including the amount
in excess of the policy face. Apparently a Missouri court has "cured" this inconsistency by following the California decision.
One authority has pointed out that it is arguable that all excess liability is
dependent upon the abuse of exclusive control over the defense, or over the decision concerning settlement. When that exclusive control is renounced by the company the basis for imposing excess liability is removed.2 2 The fallacy of this argument is exposed by a simple reminder that the insurer has a contractual duty to
defend which cannot be affected by a unilateral renunciation. However, concern11. See, e.g., McCombs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., supra note 6; Hilker v. Westem Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wisc. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
12. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Const. Co., 69 F.2d 462, 469
(8th Cir. 1934).
14. See, e.g., Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., supra note 10; Zumwalt v.
Utilities Ins. Co., supra note 6; McCombs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., supra note 6.
15. Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App.
649, 675, 60 N.E. 2d 896, 907 (1945).
16. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1965).
17. Frank B. Connet Lumber Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 236 F.2d
117 (8th Cir. 1956).
18. Landie v. Century Indem. Co., supra note 1, at 566.
19. 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 68 A.L.R2d 883 (1958).
20. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 201-2.
21. Ibid.
22. Keeton, Liability Insurance And Responsibility For Settlement, 67 HAuv.
L. REv. 1136, 1161 (1954).
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ing the insurer's liability for wrongful failure to settle, the same authority has
suggested that under the standard policy provision 23 the company agreed that it
woould defend, but only that it might settle.24 In answer to this assertion it should
be reemphasized that the Communae decision holds that the insurer still has an
implied duty to consider the insured's interest in the settlement. 25
Today, in California and Missouri, a wrongful refusal 26 to defend may result
in liability for a sum in excess of the fact amount of the insurance policy. This puts
a tremendous burden on the insurer in its investigation, negotiation, and ultimate
estimation of liability and settlement value. Insurers will have to be especially
cognizant of the factors courts have considered in finding bad faith,2 7 and whenever possible defend under a nonwaiver or reservation of rights agreement where
there is a question of coverage. If the alleged insured will not consent to such an
agreement, and the insurer defends unconditionally there is the possibility that the
court will hold that the insurer has lost its right to assert nonliability.28 Faced
with this dilemma, the insurer in the case where there is a question of coverage
and the possibility of an excessive verdict, and no reservation agreement can be
reached, should seek a declaratory judgment to protect itself from the expanded
liability under the Landie decision.
WILLu

H.

WALKER

23. Landie v. Century Indem. Co., supra note 1 at 561-2. Policy containing
standard provision, "obligated the company to defend' any suit against the insured
... and the company reserved to itself the exclusive right to make such investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient."
24. Keeton, supra note 22.
25. Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., supra note 19.
26. But see, Traveler's Indem. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 330
F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1964) (wrongful refusal in the Communde case was distinguished
from the case of a rightful denial of coverage); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Skaggs, 251 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1957) (where no excess liability was established
for refusal to defend and settle when denial was not wrongful).
27. See Jarett, supra note 9, at 66-9, for methods and precautions he suggests
in dealing with the problem of excess liability of the insurer.
28. See, e.g., Consolidated Elec. Co-op. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
106 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Mo. 1952); Mistele v. Ogle, 293 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo.
1956). See generally, Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1148, 1151 (1954).
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JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM-MISSOURI'S SINGLE ACTION
STATUTE--"MINIMUM CONTACTS"
State ex rel. M. Pressner & Co. v. Scottl

William Callow, a minor, by next friend, filed a suit against relators based
on two causes of action, one in negligence and one in breach of warranty, for
damages allegedly sustained while using a slingshot allegedly manufactured, sold,
and distributed by relators. Relators, New York corporations, were not registered
to do business in Missouri. Service of process was had on relators in accord with
a Missouri statute enacted in 19612 The statute permitted the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation committing a tort (except libel and slander)
within the state in the same manner as if it were served personally within the
state. Relators' proceeding in prohibition attacking the service of process was
granted.
The court held the statutory provision for service failed to meet the requirements of due process. Relying on Wuckter v. PizzuttP the court ruled that a
statute extending the jurisdiction of a state over nonresidents
must, by its terms, provide for a means of notice which makes it reasonably probable that the nonresident will receive actual notice...
And even actual notice, gratuitously furnished under a statute which does
not contain adequate requirements for notice, is insufficient 4
Paragraph 3 of the statute required any process served on the secretary of state
to be forwarded by registered mail to the corporation at its principal office "as the
same appears in the records of the secretary of state." 5 This, of course, was impossible. The secretary of state would have no record of the address of any unregistered foreign corporation. 6
1. 387 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
2. §§ 351.630(2)-(3), RSMo 1961 Supp. "2. If a foreign corporation commits a tort, excepting libel and slander, in whole or in part in Missouri against a
resident or nonresident of Missouri, such act shall be deemed to be doing business
in Missouri by the foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the
appointment by the foreign corporation of the secretary of state of Missouri and
his successors to be its agent and representative to accept service of any process
in any actions or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from or
growing out of the tort. .

.

. The committing of the tort shall be deemed to be

the agreement of the foreign corporation that any process against it which is so
served upon the secretary of state shall be of the same legal force and effect as
if served personally within the state of Missouri.
"3. In the event that any process, notice, or demand is served on the secretary of state, he shall immediately cause a copy thereof to be forwarded by
registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the secretary of such
corporation at its principal office as the same appears in the records of the secretary
of state.!
3. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
4. Supra note 1, at 542.
5. § 351.630(3), RSMo 1961 Supp., quoted in note 2 supra.
6. Accord, Bonnot v. Freeman Chem. Corp., 343 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1965);
cf. Leach v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 231 F. Supp. 157 (D. Colo. 1964);
Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964). Bitt cf. Maryland Nat'l
Bank v. Shaffer Stores.Co., 240 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md. 1965).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/18
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The 1965 Regular Session of the 73d General Assembly enacted a new
statute which should meet the due process requirements as to service 7 The new
statute provides that the plaintiff or his attorney shall supply the secretary of
state with the address of the corporation as shown in the official registry of the
state of its incorporation in the absence of such address in the secretary's records.
This is similar to the provision in North Carolina's "Long-Arm" statute.8 That
provision has been upheld in both the state and federal courts of North Carolina.9
In order to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant due process
traditionally has required two elements: "(1) the power to subject him to the
jurisdiction of the court, and (2) effectively bringing him before the court by
proper notice."' 10 Pennoyer v. Neffxl held that to obtain personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident there had to be personal service within the forum state. This territorial power concept tended to fuse the two requirements of due process. For a
court to have the required power basis for an in personam judgment, the defendant
had to be physically served within the territorial limits of that court's jurisdiction.2 A foreign corporation, because of the idea that corporations could exist
only in those states in which they were registered, 13 could not be served in this
manner. Some other jurisdictional power basis was needed. The courts developed
the fictive notions of "consent," "doing business," and "presence" to subject
foreign corporations to personal jurisdiction within the territorial power concept
4
of Pennoyer.'
International Shoe Co. v. Washington'5 shifted the emphasis from territoriality

to fairness. Personal jurisdiction was to be exercised over a foreign corporation if
7. Mo. Laws 1965, at -,
S.B. No. 106, § 1; V.A.M.S. § 351.633(2) 1965:
"2. In the event that any process, notice, or demand is served on the secre-,
tary of state, he shall immediately cause a copy thereof to be forwarded by
registered mail, return requested, addressed to the secretary of such corporation
at its principal office as the same appears in the records of the secretary of state,
or if there is no such address on file, then to the corporation at its office as shown
in the official registry of the state of its incorporation and such address shall be
provided by the plaintiff or his attorney."
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-145, 146 (1965).
9. Worley's Beverages, Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp., 167 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.C.
1958); Spartan Equip. Co. v. Air Placement Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 140 S.E.2d
3 (1965).
10. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 505 (4th
Cir. 1956).
11. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
12. The so-called "transient rule" which allows a defendant to be served ina
forum where he is temporarily present has been criticized. See Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Ride of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth. and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Whitacre, Jurisdiction in Personam-Single Act
Statutes-Minimum Contacts-A Nascent Doctrine of Forum Conveniens, 29 Mo.
L. REv. 370 (1964).

13. Bank of Augusta v.Earle, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 519 (1839).
14. E.g., Neirbo Co. v.Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939);"
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v.Gold Issue
Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See generally EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33
(1962); 23 Am. Jur. Foreign Corporations§ 490 (1939).
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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it had "sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable
and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice . . . 2,16 A state could meet the requirements of due process if (1) the
foreign corporation had sufficient minimum contacts with the state, and (2) a
reasonable method of notification was provided. To a limited extent, subsequent
decisions have demonstrated how the new test is to be applied. 17 Missouri courts

have been reluctant to apply the new test. The fiction of "doing business" has
remained the basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations.18
In the noted case the court specifically refused to rule on the constitutionality
of the statute as an adequate power basis for acquiring jurisdiction over a nonresident.19 It is significant, however, that the court's discussion was cast in terms
of "substantial connection" rather than "doing business":
We are not deciding whether there was here such a "substantial connection" with Missouri as to permit service. The McGee opinion is, however,
an illustration of the ever-shrinking
conception of the standards required
20
for outside service of process.
This language tends to indicate that the court is going to abandon the old theory
of "doing business," and twenty years after International Shoe, will adopt the test
21

of minimurM contacts

16. Id. at 320.
17. Subsequent decisions have, with few exceptions, expanded local jurisdiction over nonresidents. In Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952), it was held that due process neither required Ohio to take jurisdiction nor
to decline it where a Philippine corporation's president and principal shareholder
continued corporate activities in Ohio while the Philippines were under Japanese
control. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), allowed Virginia
to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a Nebraska insurance company which
had about 800 members in Virginia. The minimum contacts test became minimal
in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). California was
permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company which had only
one insured in California. The Texas corporation had assumed the obligations of
a former Arizona insurance company. The only contacts were the reinsurance
contract mailed to the insured in California and his payment of premiums by
mail from California. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), and Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), were somewhat restrictive. In Vanderbilt, the
Court held that Nevada could not extinguish a nonresident defendant's right to
alimony without personal service in Nevada. Hanson held that a Florida probate
proceeding could not bind a Delaware trustee of an inter vivos trust without personal service within the state. The trustee's only contact with Florida was a result
of dealings with the decedent who moved to Florida after creating the trust some
years earlier in Delaware. The Court required "some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla,
supra at 253.

18. See, e.g., Simpkins v. Council Mfg. Corp., 332 F.2d 733, 737 (8th Cir.

1964): "Our examination of the Missouri cases . . . satisfies us . . . that Missouri

still applies the doing business test rather than the more liberal minimal contacts
test .

...

"

19. Supra note 1, at 543.
20. Id. at 543.
21. Whether or not the court would allow recovery under the new statute
on facts similar to those in the principal case is questionable. It is clear that the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/18
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The Missouri legislature has refused to enact a broader based statute. 22
Whether the Missouri court would be willing to give effect to a broader statute
is an open question. It does appear that the present statute, as Professor Anderinstant plaintiff cannot recover. State ex rel. Clay Equip. Corp. v. Jensen, 363
S.W.2d 666 (Mo. En Banc 1963) (statute allowing jurisdiction over foreign
corporation committing tort within state held prospective only). Contra, McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 17, at 224; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d
378, 382-83, 143 N.E.2d 673, 675-76 (1957); Simonson v. International Bank, 14
N.Y.2d 281, 290, 200 N.E.2d 427, 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 440 (1964). The cases
dealing with "single-act" statutes have generally fallen into three categories: (1)
The foreign corporation is present in the state through agents or employees; (2)
the foreign corporation ships allegedly defective goods directly to the purchaser;
and (3) the foreign corporation delivers goods to an independent contractor or
dealer who resells to the consumer.
In those cases where the corporation has been "present" through agents or
employees, jurisdiction has usually attached. See, e.g., Elkhart Eng'r Corp. v.
Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965); Gkiafis v. S. S. Yiosonas, 342 F.2d
546 (4th Cir. 1965); Nelson v. Miller, supra, Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245 N.C.
576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569,
80 A.2d 664 (1951). Compare Steel Joist Institute, Inc. v. J. H. Mann, III, Inc.,
171 So.2d 625 (Fla. App. 1965), with Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Hoechst-Uhde
Corp., 338 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1964).
Jurisdiction has been upheld where there are no agents in the state, -but
shipment has been directly to the buyer. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.,
343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsical Chem.
Corp., 403 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1965). Contra, Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre
Mills, Inc., supra note 10; Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill.2d 426, 158 N.E.2d
73 (1959). As to the importance of shipping terms (F.O.B. place of shipment or
destination), compare Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.
1965), with Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn.
1965).
For cases allowing jurisdiction where an independent contractor or dealer is
interposed between the foreign corporation and consumer, see, e.g., Coreil v. Pearson, 242 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. La. 1965); Chovan v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours &
Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d
423 (Alaska 1965); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Shwayder Bros., Inc., 384 S.W.2d 473
(Ark. 1964); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Anderson v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 135 N.W.2d
639 (Iowa 1965); Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963). Contra,
Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964); Schnur & Cohan,
Inc. v. McDonald, 220 F. Supp. 9 (M.D.N.C. 1963); Young Spring & Wire
Corp. v. Smith, 176 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1965); Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Copymation,
Inc., 132 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1965); Moss v. Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119
S.E.2d 445 (1961).
The facts of the principal case would appear to place it in the third category.
It appeared that the relators sold the slingshots to a jobber in St. Louis who subsequently sold the slingshot involved to a retailer. Brief for Relators, p. 16, State
v. Scott, supra note 1. It has been in such situations that the courts have been
most reluctant to find sufficient contacts to invoke jurisdiction.
Apart from the problem of minimal contacts is the problem of statutory
construction. Statutes providing for the acquisition of jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation for torts have been drafted in two ways. Some statutes base jurisdiction upon tortious conduct or action within the state. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, § 17 (1959); N.Y. Civ. PrAc. L. & R. § 302; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145
(1965). Other statutes only require that the tort be committed in whole or in part
within the state. See, e.g., § 351.633(1), RSMo 1965 Supp.; MINN. STAT. § 303.13
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son hoped, has "changed the cautious attitude of Missouri courts regarding the
exercise of local personal jurisdiction," and will "bring Missouri more in line with
the present American trend." 23
LAWRENCE N. KOBLN

SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EAVESDROPPING-PHYSICAL
INTRUSION DOCTRINE
People v. Grossmanl
The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by officers
under New York's eavesdropping statute. 2 The police followed the procedure set
out in the statute and obtained a court order authorizing the installation of a
listening device in the defendant's private office. They installed the device (referred to by the court as a "bug") by breaking into the premises early in the
morning. The New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term, granted the motion
to suppress and held that a court order issued for purposes of eavesdropping
could not justify a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.3 If
(1957); VT. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 855 (1947). The former type has been construed to
allow jurisdiction only if some tortious act, other than the injury, is committed
in the state. See Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15
N.Y.2d 443, 461-62, 209 N.E.2d 68, 78, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 22 (1965). Contra, Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762.
The latter has been interpreted as conferring jurisdiction if the injury alone occurs within the forum state even if the defendant has acted completely without
the state. See Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 579-80, 104
N.W.2d 888, 893 (1960). The Missouri statute, since it is drafted in the terms
of those allowing a more liberal exercise of jurisdiction, should be effective where
only the injury occurs within the state.
22. Whitacre, supra note 12, at 373-74. See e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17
(1959); N.Y. Crv. Paac. L. & R. § 302; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1965).
23. Anderson, supra note 12, at 382.
1. 45 Misc.2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1965).
2. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 813 (a). This section was substantially amended
in 1965. The pre-1965 text was before the court here: "An ex parte order for the
interception, overhearing or recording of telegraphic communications may be
issued by any justice of the supreme court or judge of a county court or of the
court of general sessions of the county of New York upon oath or affirmation of a
district attorney, or of the attorney-general or of an officer above the rank of
sergeant of any political subdivision thereof, that there is reasonable ground to
believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained and identifying the particular telephone number or telegraph line, and particularly describing the person
or persons whose communications are to be intercepted, overheard or recorded
and the purpose thereof."
3. People v. Grossman, supra note 1, at 578, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 287. For authority that a man's -private office is a constitutionally protected area see, Lanza
v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921);
Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1919).
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there is a physical intrusion into a protected area, the eavesdropping comes within
the protection of the fourth amendment and the issuance of a proper warrant is
required. But, held the court, the eavesdropping order issued here did not satisfy
the requisites of a search warrant, nor could a proper warrant ever be issued for
eavesdropping in this situation.
The court based this conclusion on three factors. First, the fourth amendment
requires a .particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or
things to -be seized. Since conversations cannot be known in advance, they cannot be specified in advance to meet the requirement of description4 necessary for
the issuance of a search warrant. Second, the federal courts have held that a general search violates the fourth amendment.5 Mapp v. OkioO made the fourth
amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment; therefore, the federal restriction against general searches applies to the states. Electronic
eavesdropping is necessarily indiscriminate in that it intercepts all conversations
and is therefore a general search prohibited by the fourth amendment. Third, the
Supreme Court has prohibited searches for purely evidentiary matter as a violation of the fourth amendment. 7 This -prohibition also applies to the states as a
result of Mapp v. Ohio.8 When eavesdropping seizes conversations which have only
evidentiary value, the seizure is unconstitutional if the eavesdropping entails the
physical intrusion necessary to make the fourth amendment applicable.
The noted case reasserts the doctrine that the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures only protects one from searches and
seizures accompanied by an unauthorized physical intrusion into the protected
area. This rule of construction was established by the Supreme Court in a wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United States.9 Recently the Supreme Court in Silverman v. United States10 repeated the doctrine and applied it to eavesdropping
with other types of listening devices. Olmstead held that conversations are not
protected by the fourth amendment since sound has no physical embodiment and
therefore cannot be seized. The Supreme Court has since recognized that conversa4. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marrow v. United States, 275
U.S. 192 (1927).
5. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582 (1946); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Gouled v.
United States, supra note 3; Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237-38 (1960); Harris v. United
States, supra note 5, at 154; Davis v. United States, supra note 5, at 587; United
States v. Lefkowitz, supra note 5, at 464-66; Gouled v. United States, supra note 3,
at 311.
8. Supra note 6.
9. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10. 365 U.S. 505 (1960).
I1. "We have held that the fruits of electronic surveillance, though intangible, nevertheless are within the reach of the Amendment." Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 460 (1963). "It follows from our holding in Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, that the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of
'papers and effects."' Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
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tions can be seized,'1 and insists only that the electronic device not be planted by
an unauthorizd physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area.1 2
The courts continue to reason from the old proposition that an officer can sit
under an open window and overhear conversations' 8 to the conclusion that all
eavesdropping accomplished without a physical intrusion is reasonable.' 4 If the
declarant in the open window situation wanted privacy, he could shut his window;
but, he could not protect himself from electronic surveillance short of complete
isolation in a specially equipped paneled tent.' 5
When an individual's constitutional rights are violated while seizing evidence,
the evidence is inadmissible at trial.' 8 In the case of Goldmao v. United States T
a dictaphone receiver was attached to a party wall. The conversations which
were overheard and recorded were held to be admissible by the Supreme Court.
Since there was no unauthorized physical intrusion into the declarant's premises,
the dedarant's fourth amendment rights could not -be violated. In the case of
Silverman v. United StatesIs a spike microphone was inserted about halfway into
a party wall. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the evidence
so obtained was admissible. "We are unwilling to believe that the respective rights
are to be measured in fractions of inches."' 9 Yet the Supreme Court did measure
fourth amendment protection by fractions of inches by holding that the evidence
was not admissible because the defendant, Silverman, was the victim of a method
of eavesdropping which entailed a physical intrusion. Goldman was unlucky in that
the dictaphone did not intrude upon his property so his conversations were not
protected. These two cases illustrate how a court can reach opposite results in
practically identical fact situations because of the inflexible application of an inadequate rule.
The noted case is interesting because its holding that no warrant can issue
to permit a physical intrusion for purposes of electronic eavesdropping stretches
the protection of the fourth amendment to its logical extreme within the limitations
of the Supreme Court's physical intrusion doctrine. The next step is to protect
against all unreasonable searches and seizures regardless of whether or not a physical intrusion has taken place.
It is submitted that a search and seizure can be unreasonable even if there
is no physical intrusion when electronic listening techniques are involved. Why
12. Lopez v. United States, svpra note 11; Silverman v. United States, supra
note 10; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United
States, supra note 9. Accord, State v. Spica, 389 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1965).
13. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1962); United States v. Silverman, 166 F. Supp. 838 (1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 173 (1960), rev'd, 365 U.S. 505
(1960).
14. Ibid.
15. Packard, The Invasion of Privacy, Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1964, p. 58.
16. Wong Sun v. United States, supra note 11; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, supra note 3; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17. Supra note 12.
18. Supra note 10.
19. Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173, 178 (1960), rev'd 365 U.S. 505
(1960).
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should the protection against the invasion of privacy afforded by the fourth
amendment be limited to physical intrusions? The amendment does not prohibit
physical intrusions but rather unreasonable intrusions which invade the privacy of
one's home without a warrant. To assume that the only search and seizure which
can be unreasonable is that which involves a physical intrusion ignores the technical advances in surveillance methods. In determining whether eavesdropping is an
unreasonable invasion of privacy more should be considered than the occurrence
or nonoccurrence of an unauthorized physical invasion of one's property during
the installation of a listening device.
The elimination of the physical intrusion doctrine will leave unanswered the
extremely difficult question of what is an unreasonable search. One thing is certain:
the answer cannot be found by the application of a mechanical rule based on
anachronistic property concepts. The elimination of the doctrine hopefully would
force the courts to come to grips with the real issue of what eavesdropping, if any,
is reasonable, and replace the present superficial analysis which has been used
to evade a very difficult problem.
ROBERT K. WALDo

TROVER-DAMAGES AGAINST PURCHASER OF WILLFULLY
CONVERTED TIMBER
Koelling v. Ral

Anderson Lu~mber Co.1

Plaintiffs' upriver island had attached by silt accretions to the lower island
of Leiweke Estate Inc., although a steep embankment clearly marked the boundary.
Boyd, who had purchased the standing timber on Leiweke's end, and later Leiweke,
inquired of one of the plaintiffs as to the ownership of the upper end, and both
times this plaintiff asserted his and the other plaintiffs' title. Nevertheless, after
a cursory investigation of the plaintiffs' claim, Leiweke concluuded it had a valid
claim to the whole island. After being so informed by Leiweke, Boyd cut over
the entire island despite protests by the plaintiffs. However, Boyd instructed his
purchaser, defendant Ralph Anderson Lumber Company, to record separately
the cut timber Anderson took from the upper end and explained that plaintiffs'
claim made this necessary. Plaintiffs sued Anderson in trover and recovered the
reasonable market value of the cut timber, $7,250. The St. Louis Court of Appeals
reduced this to the reasonable market value of the uncut timber, $2,000.
On transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court, the primary issue was restriction
of recovery to stampage (i.., uncut) value. The supreme court reversed the
assessment of the appellate court and affirmed that of the trial court. The principles acknowledged by the Supreme Court as controlling were those enunciated
1. 392 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
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in Sligo Furnace Co. v. Hobart-Lee Tie Co2 which had aligned Missouri with the
majority of American jurisdictions in deciding suits brought against the original
converter.3 Koelling represents Missouri's first extension of the rule and logic of
that case to an action against the converter's vendee. This extension definitely
.aligns Missouri with the decisions of most courts in actions brought against the
purchaser. 4 Missouri and the majority of courts hold that an innocent converter
and his bona fide purchaser are liable only -for market stumpage value at the time
of conversion, but that a willful converter and his purchaser, bona fide or not, are
liable for something more. How much Tnore is itself a complex question, the answer
to which is affected by other factors in the broad area of law under which Koelling
falls, the law of accession. 5 It will suffice here to say that in Missouri if the claim
is against the original, willful converter, damages are the reasonable market value
of the timber in its improved condition. 6 Improved condition encompasses all accessions (i.e., increases in value) made by the original converter. For instance, if the
willful converter not only improved the timber by severance but also cut it into
lumber and transported it to the purchaser, the converter could be liable for the
value at its point of greatest improvement. Although some point might be reached
at which the converter had so greatly improved the chattel's value that the true
owner could not recover its worth in this improved condition, there is no Missouri
case setting such a point. If the action is against the vendee, damages are the
reasonable market value of the timber when purchased, which value would equal
the value of the chattel immediately before leaving the possession of the original
7
converter.
When the action is against the original, innocent converter or his bona fide
purchaser, the majority of jurisdictions would assess only stumpage value, reasoning that the true owner is not entitled to the value bestowed by the labor of an
innocent man and that the higher assessment would be too harsh on the innocent
2. 153 Mo. App. 442, 445, 134 S.W. 585, 587 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911).
3. See Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432 (1882); White v.
Yawkey, 108 Ala. 270, 19 So. 360 (1895); Whitney v. Huntington, 37 Minn. 197,

33 N.W. 561 (1887). See also cases cited in

BROWN, PERSONAL PRovETY

§§ 27

n.26, 28 n.32 (2d ed. 1956). See also 89 C.J.S. Trover and Conversion §§ 167-70,
198 (1955); 1 AM. JuR.2d Accession and Confusion §§ 29, 30 (1962).
4. See Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, supra note 3; H. D. Williams
Cooperage Co. v. United States, 221 Fed. 234 (8th Cir. 1915).
5. Compare Gratz v. McKee, 270 Fed. 713 (8th Cir. 1920) and Winchester v.
Craig, 33 Mich. 205 (1876), with Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 47 S.W. 123
(1898) and Schwanz v. Farmers Co-op Co., 204 Iowa 1273, 214 N.W. 491 (1927)
to see distinctions between natural and non-natural increases in value of chattel.
See Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 103
(1922); Gordon, Anomalies in the Law of Conversion, 71 L.Q. REv. 346 (1955)
for discussions of whether the market value at conversion, at suit, or at the highest
point between conversion and suit should be the market for determining damages.
For holdings that the market at time of conversion is the basis for determining
damages in Missouri, see generally National Sur. Corp. v. Hochman, 313 S.W.2d
776 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958); Pantz v. Nelson, 234 Mo. App. 1043, 135 S.W.2d
397 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939); Deer v. People's Bank, 47 S.W.2d 787 (Spr. Mo. App.
1932). But cf. Hendricks v. Evans, 46 Mo. App. 313 (K.C. Ct. App. 1891).
6. Supra note 2, at 445.
7. Supra note 1, at 394.
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pirty.8 As the true owner can never recover more from the bona fide purchaser
than stumpage, so the purchaser can never recover more than that by a warranty
action against the original converter. 9 Consequently, the innocent converter seems
protected from any action seeking more than recovery for stumpage value.' 0 On
the other hand, when the action is against a willful converter, the higher recovery
is granted on the theory that he should not be allowed to profit by -his own wrong."
When the action is against his purchaser, the higher damages have been justified
on two bases. The vendee can recover from his vendor, and the net result is the
same as if the action were against the original converter. Also the vendor can pass
no rights to the vendee because of the willfulness of the conversion. Therefore, the
vendee is liable for the increased value under the rule of caveat emptor.12 Although
the final effect of the rule as to willful converters seems similar to a penal sanction,
the courts have avoided basing the higher recovery on a punitive theory of dam8
ages.'
Two other positions have been taken by the, courts, neither of which is concerned with the willfulness of the original converter or its effect on the liability
of his bona fide purchaser. The Delaware rule, applied only in that jurisdiction,
emphasizes two fundamental principles of trover.14 First, a converter is liable for
the value of the chattel at the time and place of conversion.18 Second, any unauthorized act which deprives an owner of his property is a conversion. 16 Therefore, the owner can elect to sue for the value as of the last improvement since the
last improvement is as much a conversion as the first act contravening the owner's
rights. Moreover, since purchase of this sort of converted personalty is a conversion,
and since the original converter cannot obtain any passable rights in the chattel by

8. Supra note 2, at 445. See Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, svwpra note
3, at 434.
9. A difficult, though improbable, problem might be raised where there is a
mala fide purchaser and the converter-accessioner is innocent. In an action
against the mala fide purchaser the true owner could recover the improved value.
See Eisenberg v. Nelson, 247 S.W. 244 (St. L. Mo. App. 1923). See also Brandon
v. Stone, 237 Mo. App. 671, 162 S.W2d 83 (Spr. Ct. App. 1942); Smith v. Baechler,
[1890J 18 Ont. 293. In a later action by the purchaser against the converter-accessioner, the purchaser could recover the amount of the previous judgment on a
theory of warranty. See cases cited note 10 infra for basis of such a warranty recovery. If such a situation did arise, it is possible the innocent converter would not
be protected by the majority rule.
10. Shultis v. Rice, 114 Mo. App. 274, 89 S.W. 357 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
Cf. Matheny v. Mason, 73 Mo. 677 (1881); Schaefer v. Fulton Iron Works Co.,
158 S.W.2d 452 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942). See also 46 AM. JUR. Sales §§ 403-05
(1943).
11. Supra note 2, at 445. See Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, supra note 3.
12. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, supra note 3; H. D. Williams Cooperage Co. v. United States, supra note 4. See Shultis v. Rice, sunpra note 10.
13. See cases cited note 3 supra. Contra, State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 63
Minn. 99, 64 N.W. 81 (1895).
14. Harris v. Goslin, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 340 (1841).
15. E.g., Osborn v. Chandeysson Elec. Co., 248 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1952). See
also cases cited in 89 CJ.S. Trover and Conversion § 165 (1955).
16. E.g., Martin v. Sikes, 38 Wash.2d 274, 229 P.2d 546 (1951). See also
cases cited in 89 C.J.S. Trover and Conversion § 1 (1955).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 18
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

a series of improvements (i.e., conversions), the vendee would seem liable for the
value at the time he took possession. 17
The other minority view would deny any assessment greater than the reasonable market value of the timber the moment after it was severed and became
personalty. Those courts so holding reason that in conversion damages can date
only from the time the timber becomes personalty, but that damages should be no
more than severed value since that is the extent of the owner's loss.18 However,
the importance of this position has been diminished by statutes allowing double
the stumpage value as damages where there was no probable cause to believe the
taking was rightful.19 The majority, drawing heavily on concepts of equity, 20 has
the advantage of preventing harsh results while still discouraging conversions. The
minority rules appear easier to apply as standards of assessment since they do not
incorporate the factual or legal difficulties arising from using "willful" as a standard
of assessment.21
Prior to Koeling, Missouri, like most other states following the majority rule,
had not formulated a definition of "willful" in a common law action in trover
where an accession to a chattel has occurred. 2 2 The general practice had been
merely to discuss the facts which seemed significant and then to state a conclusion
that these facts either did or did not demonstrate "willful" conversion. Koelling
is more precise in that it establishes a line of conduct at which recovery is no
longer limited to stumpage value and the conversion will be considered "willful."
Where the converter is more than merely inadvertent (i.e. negligent) ,23 the conversion will be considered "willful" and the higher recovery allowed.2 4 The court
in Koelling reasoned that the notice the original converters had of the plaintiffs'
claim and the doubt of the validity of their own claim, as evidenced by requiring
their vendee to record specifically what he took from the disputed section, took
the original converters beyond the point of mere negligence. The purchaser-defendant, Anderson, was therefore liable for the improved value of the timber.25
Koelling does present at least one disturbing problem which the supreme
court does not discuss. While both the trial court and the supreme court found
17.
18.
Ry., 17
Arnold,

See Harris v. Goslin, supra note 14 at 343.
Single v. Schneider, 24 Wis. 299 (1869); Weymouth v. Chicago & N.W,
Wis. 567 (1863). For conflicting interpretations of these cases compare
The Law of Accession of Personal Property, supra note 5, at 114 with
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTYI, supra note 7, at § 27 n.29.
19. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 26.09 (1964). See also Swedowski v. Westgor, 14
Wis.2d 47, 109 N.W.2d 549 (1961).
20. See Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, supra note 2, at 436. See also
Livingstone v. Rawyards [18802 5 App. Cas. 33 (Scot.) (Scottish case decided on
English authorities).
21. Compare Gladys Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. v. Right of Way Oil Co., 137
S.W. 171 (Tex. 1911) with. Houston Prod. Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d
75 (Tex. 1933). See Johnson, When is a Trespasser in Good Faith?, 25 OKLA.
B.AJ. 1491 (1954).
22. See supra note 2. See also cases cited note 3 supra.
23. Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 162 S.W. 280 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913);.
Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 274 S.W. 876 (Spr. Mo. App. 1925).
24. Supra note 1, at 396.
25. Ibid.
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Anderson liable for $7,250, they did so for different reasons. The supreme court
applied a rule which may properly be called a part of the law of accession. However, the trial court held Anderson's going on plaintiffs' land and removing the cut
timber was a new and separate conversion done by Anderson alone and quite
apart from anything having to do with a purchase. He was liable for the value of
the timber at the time and place of this separate conversion, which would be the
cut value. 26 If the plaintiffs can be considered in possession of the timber which
they knew had been cut from and was lying on their land, Anderson's carrying
away was a direct interference with their possession. Koelling might be a stronger
basis upon which to found the majority rule in Missouri if it had included a discussion of why Anderson's actions did not distinguish the Koelling fact situation from
the situations in the precedent cases, in all of which the converter had transported
the converted chattels to the purchaser.
Despite this undiscussed problem and the difficulties resulting from the
presense of "willful" as a standard of assessment in the majority rule itself, the
majority rule seems to reach an equitable and just solution in an area filled with
questions of logic and policy.
RicmARD W. PMnRSON

26. Brief for Appellant Ralph Anderson Lumber Co., pp. 14-17, Koelling v.
Ralph Anderson Lumber Co., supra note 1.
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